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Unemployment has been at unacceptable levels for at least twenty-five years and is probably Australia’s 
most serious economic and social problem. Emphasising the economics of the unemployment problem 
and focussing mainly on the labour market, a historical approach was used which viewed 
unemployment as consisting of two parts: a cyclical component and an underlying component, divided 
into three historical periods: 1950 to the early-mid 1970s; early-mid 1970s to the early 1980s and early 
1980s to the present. The paper addressed: the unemployment response to labour market deregulation 
policies over the last decade; new policy ideas to reduce unemployment; the unemployment cycle and 
the current and near future unemployment situation.  The conclusions reached were: that labour 
productivity growth has increased but this has increased real wages; policies to reduce unemployment 
over the last decade in general have so far not been successful nor is it expected that currently proposed 
new policy ideas will be able to substantially reduce unemployment. It is also unlikely that avoidance of 
a recession will be sufficient to achieve a sustained and significant reduction in unemployment.  This is 
particularly the case if there is no mechanism for real wage moderation and if labour supply reductions 
cease to be important.  
 
   1 
Introduction 
Most Australians regard the current level of unemployment as undesirable. It delivers 
personal hardship to most of the unemployed and their families and is slowly 
changing the nature of our society in undesirable ways. Poor and depressed 
neighbourhoods are growing in our cities. One third of our children live in families 
with no employed adult. An increasing proportion of people of working age appears 
to be increasingly welfare dependent. Unemployment has been at unacceptable levels 
for at least twenty-five years and it is probably Australia’s most serious economic 
and social problem.  
Why then has the unemployment problem been so difficult to solve? As is to be 
expected, given our long-standing failure, the answer includes inadequacies of 
economic theory and economic policies but also extends into the nature of our society 
and its changing ability to marshal political support for policies which may be more 
effective. Achieving an unemployment solution has become as much a political as an 
economic task. How then should the discussion proceed? It is not possible to cover 
fully the subtleties of the interactions between politics and economic policies so most 
of the emphasis will be on the economics of the unemployment problem, with 
occasional detours into some of the political difficulties we face.   
There is another choice to be made. Unemployment is primarily a macro 
phenomena and its causes lie predominantly in the macro economy. So where should 
we focus?  Is the source of our unemployment inadequate saving, inadequate 
investment, restrictive monetary policy and so on, or does the cause lie elsewhere? 
Indeed is there one cause? We cannot explore all these possible relationships so, along 
with most economists, we have put most of our emphasis on the labour market, 
although it is not at all clear that this is the source of the unemployment problem1. It 
may well be that unemployment is a symptom of problems that lie elsewhere in the 
economy. All aspects of the economy are linked together and it is always a matter of 
judgement what to include in the discussion and what to exclude. 
To begin, we adopt an historical approach. Understanding our history throws 
light on the current policy debate, provides some indication of the likely success of 
different labour market policies and helps us to understand the changing political 
environment. Importantly, it teaches us to be sceptical of instant and easy solutions. 
Not every economist would accept that history matters for understanding the 
economics of the policy solutions for unemployment. Many might argue, for example, 
that if unemployment is judged to be too high - whatever the cause and whatever the 
history that led to this situation – there is always the same solution.  Real wages must 
be reduced to create more jobs and lower labour supply. This is the unemployment 
solution taught in first year micro economics with its emphasis on demand and supply 
of labour and an equilibrating wage. But history provides us with some indication as 
to whether real wages are the source of the unemployment problem and some 
indication of how easy it is to bring about real wage changes in the Australian labour 
market.  
                                                            
1  This paper discusses only a few of the important issues. The reader might like to consult the 
following surveys,  Anh T. Le and Paul W. Miller (2000), which primarily adopts a micro approach to 
unemployment, and the papers collected in  Debelle, G. and  J. Borland  (1998) which largely take a 
macro approach.   2 
Other economists might argue that history was once relevant for understanding 
the level of unemployment, and for providing the experience necessary to design 
appropriate unemployment policies, but now the past is no longer a good guide. They 
believe that there is a new information economy rapidly evolving and the labour 
market is changing so much in response to new technologies that an analysis of the 
past has little policy relevance. Although it is true that the economy is changing we 
believe that an historical approach is necessary to identify the extent of the changes in 
the labour market and to assess their relevance.  
Once an historical approach is adopted it appears sensible to think of 
unemployment as consisting of two parts; a cyclical component, which is the 
unemployment response to the economic business cycle, and an underlying, or long 
run unemployment rate around which the unemployment cycle is imposed.  It is a 
crucial judgement as to whether it is sensible to divide unemployment into these two 
categories and whether the factors that contribute to each part of unemployment are 
different. For example, it is clear that monetary policy affects the unemployment cycle 
but most economists would not accept that monetary policy affects the underlying 
unemployment rate2.  
It is useful then to begin with Figure 1 which plots the Australian unemployment 
rate over the period 1950 to 2000. We divide unemployment into three historical 
periods indicated by the three straight lines which are our estimates of the underlying 
unemployment rate. This historical conceptualisation –  three unemployment periods 
and unemployment having two components - is important. It plays a major part in 
determining the way in which the unemployment problem is viewed, the way in which 




                                                            
2  The underlying rate of unemployment is often referred to as the natural rate of unemployment. 


























Estimate of Underlying Unemployment Rate  3 
The first unemployment period is from 1950 to the early to mid 1970s. This 
period is characterised by a low underlying unemployment rate. In the environment of 
the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s the underlying rate of unemployment was so low, 
and the upward trend so slight, that the underlying rate of unemployment was ignored. 
Policy makers directed their attention to managing unemployment and the macro 
economic cycle as though they were the same phenomenon. When unemployment was 
too high monetary policy was loosened and the settings of fiscal policy placed in 
expansion mode. When unemployment was too low monetary and fiscal policy were 
tightened. Unemployment policy seemed to fit very comfortably with the application 
of Keynesian demand side economic theory. Any unemployment problem was viewed 
as a cyclical problem.  
The second unemployment period extends from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s 
when unemployment increased from around 2 per cent to around 7 per cent. The 
dominant contributor to the increase in unemployment to a new level appears to be the 
underlying rate of unemployment. The policy emphasis therefore shifted away from 
demand side management and cyclical unemployment to a concern about the 
determinants of the underlying rate of unemployment.  A new range of questions, not 
related to demand management and the unemployment cycle, moved onto the policy 
agenda.  
The third unemployment period is from around the early 1980s to today. The 
unemployment cycle and the underlying unemployment rate pose a larger policy and 
social problem than in any other period over the last fifty years.  The underlying rate 
of unemployment has remained on the very high plateau that was reached in the early 
1980s and cyclical unemployment variations have been very much larger, relative to 
the movements of unemployment during the fifties and sixties. The unemployment 
increase in the early 1980s and 1990s recession was around 6 percentage points. 
During the 1950s and 1960s the largest cyclical increase in unemployment was around 
2 percentage points. 
The interpretation of the unemployment history presented in Figure 1 suggests 
four important issues to be addressed. Section I discusses changes in the underlying 
rate of unemployment. Why did the base rate of unemployment increase from one 
level to another over the 1975 to the early 1980s period and why has it remained at 
high levels? Can we learn anything about good unemployment policy for today from 
these experiences? 
Section II continues the focus on the underlying rate of unemployment and 
assesses the unemployment response to the new policies of labour market deregulation 
that have been introduced over the last decade.  
Section III looks briefly at new policy ideas to reduce unemployment. These new 
ideas include wage reductions for the low paid and adopting a much tougher attitude 
towards income support for those not employed.  
Section IV moves the focus to the unemployment cycle, comments briefly on the 
current unemployment situation and the prospects for a major recession in the near 
future?  
Section IV offers concluding comments. 
 
   4 
Section I 
Why Has the Underlying Unemployment Rate Increased So Much? 
One way of explaining changes in the underlying unemployment rate is to focus 
on the basic theoretical model of the relationship between average real wages, average 
labour productivity and the level of employment.  At any point of time - given 
technology, the capital stock and the supply of labour - there is an average real wage 
and associated average labour productivity which will generate full employment. An 
efficient labour market will produce this real wage. If the real wage is maintained 
above this level there will be unemployment. Consider a number of examples of the 
way in which this model works. 
If the economy is at full employment there is a balance between real wages and 
labour productivity. Then if real wages increase suddenly, without an increase in 
labour productivity, firm profitability will fall. Firms will be paying more per worker 
(real wages have increased) without receiving additional output per worker (labour 
productivity has not changed). In response, firms will attempt to offset their 
profitability decline. In a competitive environment, firms will reduce employment to 
increase labour productivity and restore the balance between average real wages and 
labour productivity. In this way the profit fall is reversed and unemployment increases 
as employment falls.  
In an efficient labour market the additional unemployment generated by the 
sudden real wage increase create pressures to reduce the real wage as workers 
compete for the reduced number of jobs. In response, real wages begin to move back 
to their original level and employment increases in response to the real wage 
reductions until the economy is back to full employment. 
If the labour market is not efficient the real wage may not respond quickly to 
unemployment and remain above the full employment level. Under these 
circumstances labour productivity will adjust to the new real wage but the new 
balance between real wages and labour productivity will not occur at full employment. 
At any particular time, with a given technology, capital stock and labour supply there 
is one real wage and associated labour productivity that is consistent with full 
employment. 
During the 1950s and 1960s the underlying rate of unemployment was consistent 
with full employment and the balance between real wages and average labour 
productivity was maintained. Real wages and average labour productivity increased at 
the same rate in response to technological change, labour supply and capital 
accumulation. The Australian labour market with strong unions and a centralised 
wage fixing system operated as though it was efficient. Indeed, along with a number 
of European economies the labour market appeared to be more efficient than that of 
the US where the underlying unemployment rate was much higher3.  
Then, during the early 1970s, something happened to the efficiency of the 
Australian labour market. There were two distinct aspects of this reduction in 
efficiency.  First, real wage increases suddenly accelerated above the average rate of 
increase of the previous two decades without an accompanying increase in the 
underlying rate of technological change. The increase in real wages created a real 
                                                            
3  See the comments in Gregory, Klug and Martin (1999).   5 
wage-labour productivity imbalance. As a result, there was a “real wage overhang” – 
that is, the real wage level by 1975 exceeded the level of labour productivity that 
would prevail at full employment. In response to this imbalance, firms reduced 
employment and increased labour productivity as less labour was applied to the 
existing capital stock. This process continued until labour productivity and real wages 
were once again in balance. The new balance, however, was at a higher rate of 
unemployment. Second, it was widely believed that the labour market would not 
reverse the real wage increase. Real wages would not be sufficiently responsive to the 
increase in unemployment.   
The “real wage overhang” theory led to a clear-cut policy solution. To restore 
full employment average real wages should be reduced or maintained at their current 
level to allow the rate of technical progress that would normally occur to increase 
labour productivity. Technological change, unmatched by real wage increases, would 
create another imbalance between labour productivity and real wages as the labour 
demand curve moved to the right. This would create further employment to close the 
gap. The response to the “real wage overhang” could be reversed and the underlying 
unemployment rate could return to its previous level. Any further real wage increases 
should be avoided until unemployment fell to acceptable levels.  
The “real wage overhang” theory has its counterpart, in one form or another, in 
all macro and micro economic textbooks and, as a result, was widely accepted by 
economists. It quickly became conventional wisdom among governments and 
provided the stimulus for the real wage indexation policies from April 1975 onwards. 
These policies were to protect employees against real wage falls and, in this way, 
encourage unions not to seek further real wage increases. Later, the focus on real wage 
moderation, was adopted as the centre piece of the Accord by the Australian Labour 
Party. All major political parties, therefore, more or less accepted that excessive real 
wage increases were the source of the unemployment problem and that there should 
be some form of intervention into the labour market to improve its efficiency. Most 
important commentators and policy advisers – such as the Treasury, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia and the OECD – also believed that real wage constancy for a substantial 
period of time, or real wage reductions, were a necessary condition for unemployment 
reductions. 
In retrospect, this emphasis on the real wage increase as the sole explanation of 
the increase in the underlying unemployment rate now seems inadequate. A number of 
puzzles have emerged which are important for the development of current policy. 
These puzzles go straight to the central issue of the diagnosis that the excessive real 
wage increases were the cause of the subdued employment growth, and the 
recommended policy solution that real wages should not increase until full 
employment is restored.   
 
Were Large Real Wage Increases the Primary Cause of the Increase in 
the Underlying Unemployment Rate?  
Figure 2 presents the real wage index from 1964 to 2000, 1995=100.  Real wage 
changes seem to divide into four different periods: (i) 1964-1973, steady real wage 
increases (ii) 1973-1975, acceleration of the rate of growth of real wages (iii) 1976 to 
1995, more or less real wage constancy, and (iv) 1995 onwards when average real 
wages increased at a rate similar to that of the 1950s and 1960s.   6 
 
 
There does not seem to be much disagreement that the exceptional real wage 
increases of the 1973–1975 period posed a problem for the macro economy. But the 
first puzzle is that the real wage increases do not seem sufficiently large, relative to 
past increases, to have brought about such a significant increase in the underlying rate 
of unemployment.  On the basis of past trends, it should have taken only three years of 
real wage constancy for the trend rate of technical change to increase labour 
productivity and restore the real wage-labour productivity balance compatible with 
full employment. Indeed by 1977 real wages were back on trend. Yet, despite real 
wage moderation, unemployment continued to increase and twenty-five years later 
unemployment has not returned to pre-1975 levels. 
The second puzzle is that although average real wages hardly increased at all for 
fifteen years after 1975, unemployment has remained high. For example, by 1990, real 
wages were about 30 per cent below a trend projection based on the 1950s and 1960s 
data and yet there was no evidence that the underlying rate of unemployment had 
fallen in response? Why was real wage moderation so ineffective as an unemployment 
solution?  
These puzzles can be explained, within the spirit of the “real wage overhang” 
theory, if the macro rate of technological change had slowed dramatically sometime 
from the early 1970s, in much the same way as technological change and the rate of 
growth of labour productivity had slowed in the US. A slower rate of technological 
change would produce a slower rate of growth of labour productivity consistent with 
full employment.  Consequently, to maintain the balance between real wages and 
labour productivity at full employment the economy would need to generate a much 
lower rate of real wage increases during the early 1970s than in the past. But the 
opposite occurred and real wage increases accelerated. 
   7 
If there was a slower rate of technological change during the 1970s and 1980s 
this considerably alters conventional historical analysis and our assessment of the 
correct policy response at this time.  Even if there had been no acceleration in the 
growth rate of real wages the slow down in the rate of technological change would 
have created a significant unemployment problem. The past trend of real wages, if it 
was to continue into the future, would not have been consistent with full employment. 
 The difficulty, therefore, becomes not so much the exceptional real wage increase but 
the inability of the Australian labour market to recognise a productivity slow down 
and quickly produce a slower rate of real wage increase in response. This shift in 
emphasis towards a change in the rate of technological change as an explanation of 
the large increase in unemployment is not trivial. It begins to explain why the high 
underlying unemployment rate has persisted until today.    
The emphasis on the slow down in the rate of technological change suggests that 
the 1970-75 real wage increase was more serious than was thought at the time. The 
acceleration of real wages should not have been judged relative to past real wage 
trends but judged relative to the rate of growth of labour productivity that was 
consistent with full employment. Because the rate of growth of full employment 
labour productivity slowed so much in advance of the large real wage increase the real 
wage overhang was very substantial. Hence the increase in unemployment was 
considerable. 
The slow down in the rate of technological change, and hence the growth rate of 
the underlying full employment labour productivity, meant that it would take much 
longer to remove the real wage overhang. As an extreme example, if the rate of 
growth of the full employment level of labour productivity was zero from 1970 
onwards the “real wage” overhang could not be removed by keeping the real wage 
constant and waiting for technology to increase labour productivity to remove the gap. 
Removal of the real wage overhang would require a real wage reduction. 
In retrospect this suggests that intervention into the labour market should have 
attempted to achieve a reversal of the real wage increase rather than real wage 
indexation.  For a number of reasons this would not have been easy to achieve.  About 
one third of the real wage increase took the form of establishing equal pay for women. 
In the political climate of the times this could not have been openly rolled back. 
Furthermore, the real wage effect on unemployment seemed manageable with the 
passage of three of four years. Finally, there were so many other changes occurring at 
the time – such as the manufacturing sector response to tariff reductions and the large 
exchange rate appreciations – that made it difficult to completely accept the real wage 
increase was so important.        
 
Section II 
The New Labour Market Policy and Its Impact on the Underlying 
Unemployment Rate. 
When the Labour Party was elected in 1983 the Accord – an agreement between the 
Labour Party and the Australian Council of Trade Unions – was a central part of 
economic policy.  The Accord was set up to help avoid another real wage increase 
when unemployment fell during the recovery from the 1982-1983 recession.  The   8 
Accord process, with its emphasis on centralised wage fixing and real wage 
maintenance, carried within it political tensions that increased through time and 
eventually led to its abandonment.  Centralised wage fixing effectively robbed union 
officials of one of their most important functions, fighting for wage increases for 
their members. As a result, the trade union movement became increasingly 
disillusioned with the Accord. Gradually policy began to dismantle the centralised 
wage fixing system. This began under the Labour Government at the beginning of the 
1990s and has been extended during the Liberal and National Coalition government. 
The emphasis of the new policy has been to shift wage bargaining to the enterprise 
level, weakening the role of trade unions and to deregulating the labour market. 
This process of deregulating the labour market has effectively removed 
centralised control of average wage outcomes. Consequently, if real wages and full 
employment labour productivity are out of balance, and there is a need for moderation 
of average wage increases, there are no direct policy instruments that government can 
bring to bear on the problem. The centralised wage fixing system, which was the 
widely accepted instrument to bring about the policy solution advocated during the 
1970s and 1980s, has been abandoned.  
The new policy for the labour market is based on two important propositions. 
First, there is a strong belief among many policy advisers that any real wage-labour 
productivity imbalance should be corrected by the free workings of the labour market. 
In an efficient and well working labour market any real wage-labour productivity 
imbalance will be a transitory problem.  If real wages are too high, and unemployment 
is created, then, in an efficient labour market, the unemployed will exert pressure for 
the real wage to fall and restore full employment.  If the labour market is unable to 
produce full employment further labour market deregulation is required to increase 
efficiency. Full employment is now seen as a problem of institutional design of labour 
markets rather than a problem of demand management.   
Second, the new labour market policy in the early years, placed considerable 
emphasis on enterprise bargaining as a method by which firms and unions could 
increase labour productivity and increase the firms ability to pay wage increases. A 
policy of enterprise bargaining, weaker trade unions and deregulation of the labour 
market was seen as a way to increase the rate of technological change. 
How is the labour market performing under its new institutional structure? Is it 
moving towards producing real wage outcomes compatible with full employment? Is 
employment increasing and unemployment falling as a result of the new labour market 
flexibility?  
 
Average Real Wages  
It is apparent from Figure 2 that after the break down of the Accord, and as the new 
labour market policy became increasingly effective, average real wages have begun 
to increase quite quickly. Over the last five years real wages have increased by an 
average of 2 per cent per annum. Indeed, all of the real wage increase since 1980 has 
occurred in the last five years. The labour productivity growth rate has also 
accelerated since the 1991-1993 recession and real wage and labour productivity 
increases have moved in a parallel fashion. The increased rate of growth of real 
wages and labour productivity, viewed in isolation, are good outcomes. Employees 
are now better off than before.  But there is a problem.   9 
The market generated real wage increases are occurring despite very high 
unemployment rates. But a major objective of the policy to change labour market 
institutions was to moderate real wage increases so that the underlying unemployment 
rate could fall. But this has not occurred. With respect to the real wage-unemployment 
nexus the labour market has not increased its efficiency. At this point of time nothing 
seems to have changed and underlying unemployment remains high. 
It is interesting to note that the current real wage acceleration, at a time of high 
unemployment, is not being discussed in the same manner as the real wage increases 
of the 1970s. Indeed it is common to hear politicians and policy commentators 
endorse the current real wage increases as a good thing and evidence of success of the 
new policy stance.  Policy advisers and commentators are not stressing that perhaps 
the labour market has become less efficient under the new institutional framework 
because high rates of unemployment are no longer controlling the rate of increase of 
real wages. The central idea that average real wage moderation is a precondition for 
employment growth, and that there should be policies that directly impinge on real 
wage increases, has been largely abandoned. 
If we accept the theory of the real wage-unemployment nexus, which was the 
centre-piece of Australian policy for so long, how can the current outcome be 
regarded as satisfactory? Perhaps there is evidence that the new labour market 
structure is producing higher employment growth so that the current high rate of 
unemployment is just a transitory phenomenon?  
 
Employment and Unemployment  
Figure 3 presents the history of the employment-population ratio over the last two 
and a half decades. It is apparent that the employment response to the new labour 
market policy is disappointing. After an initial rebound from the 1991-1993 
recession, similar to the rebound from the 1982 recession, the rate of employment 
growth has slowed.  Indeed, relative to the working age population there has been no 
significant employment growth since 1995. The increase in the rate of technological 
change is being directed towards labour productivity and real wage increases rather 
than additional jobs. 
The disappointing employment outcome can be made clearer by plotting the 
employment-population ratio over the two periods of different labour market 
institutional structures, the centralised wage fixing period (the Accord) and the recent 
period of encouraging enterprise bargaining, weakening trade unions and labour 
market deregulation. We date the first period from June 1983, the trough of the 
recession, and the second period from September 1993, also a trough of a recession 
(Figure 4). The employment-population ratio at each starting point is set at 1.00 so we 
can directly compare the employment growth of the two periods.  




During the first four years of the recovery from each recession the pattern of 
employment growth has been similar, although marginally stronger during the Accord 
period. But from the four year mark after the trough of the recessions employment 
growth during the Accord period has been much stronger. Since 1995 the Australian 
labour market has been experiencing something similar to a jobless growth, once 
allowance is made for increases in the population. The contrast between the late 1980s 
and the late 1990s is very clear. Six and half years after the troughs of the recessions 
point the Accord period had generated more additional jobs than the new labour   11 
market regime. Figure 4 extends the Accord period into the large recession of 1991-
1993.  It is apparent that even if a decline in employment is avoided over the next 
twelve to eighteen months the new institutional structure will not have managed to 
generate as many jobs as the previous period unless there is an upturn in employment 
growth.  
These employment facts make the current policy dilemma clear. The job creation 
ability of the current policy and institutional structure of the labour market does not 
appear superior to the employment creating ability of the centralised wage fixing 
system during the Accord period. Indeed, to date it might be argued that with regard to 
employment generation the new system has failed. From the viewpoint of the 
unemployed the new labour market is generating the wrong wage-employment 
outcomes. The new labour market is delivering the gains from a faster rate of 
technological change to those that are employed rather than creating new jobs for the 
unemployed. This has always been seen as a key problem that is likely ot be 
encountered in deregulating European/Australian type labour markets. Without a 
framework for real-wage intervention it appears to be difficult to bring real wages and 
labour productivity back into balance at full employment after the system is subject to 
an adverse shock. 
What can be done?  In principle, and within the context of this discussion, there 
are two possible responses; a move back towards centralized wage fixing or a further 
move towards labour market deregulation in the hope that this will provide more real 
wage moderation.  
In practice, either of these possible policy responses will be difficult. After so 
much dismantling of the old system, and in an environment where unions are weaker, 
it would be difficult to reverse current policy and move back to a more effective 
centralised wage fixing system. Union influence is not as great as before and trade 
unions may no longer be able to exercise significant control over wage outcomes. 
A move towards further labour market deregulation may also fail to moderate 
average real wage growth. After all it has failed to do so to date. Are there any other 




New Ideas and Policies to Reduce Unemployment  
Reducing Relative Real Wage of the Low Paid 
One possible way out of this dilemma has been suggested by a group of five 
economists4. They argue that wages matter but it is relative wages rather than 
average wages that are important. The argument is that unemployment is not so much 
the outcome of the average wage-full employment labour productivity link, that we 
stressed earlier, but a response to the wage prevailing in labour markets where there 
is significant unemployment.  Hence, it is the average wage of the young and the 
unskilled that is too high relative to their productivity. The real wage-unemployment 
                                                            
4  The five economists are Professor P. Dawkins, Professor J. Freebairn, Professor R. Garnaut, Dr M. 
Keating and Dr C. Richardson. The basic ideas can be found in  Dawkins and Freebairn  (1997).   12 
focus has shifted towards micro markets.  
The five economists believe that the centralised wage system still has a role to 
play in bringing about a fall in wages of the low paid and those groups experiencing 
high rates of unemployment. Within the current pay setting framework the low paid 
who fail to gain wage increases in the market place can still access across-the-board 
safety net wage increases through the Industrial Relations Commission. The five 
economists argue that this access should cease and that wage increases should be 
denied to the low paid.  If the low paid fail to obtain safety net wage increases the 
increase in the average wage will be less and hence there will be two sources of 
employment stimulus, a reduction in relative wages of the low paid and a lower rate of 
average wage increases. 
Would such a policy work?  How large a real wage reduction do they envisage 
for the low paid?  The five economists have suggested that a reduction of 5 per cent 
may be sufficient. One way to develop a feel for the likely success of the suggested 
policy is to look at what has been happening to the wages of the low paid.  Figure 5 
and Figure 6 plot earnings from full time work at the 80th, 50th and 10th percentile of 
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Over the period of high unemployment, the dispersion of earnings from full time 
employment has widened significantly for men and women, both before and after the 
Accord period. Since 1975, there has been a 5 per cent reduction in real earnings from 
full time work for men at the 10
th percentile and an increase of 20 per cent at the 80th 
percentile. For women real earnings at the 10th percentile have remained constant 
while real wages at the 80th have increased 25 per cent.  At this point, would a further 
5 per cent reduction of real wages at the bottom of the distribution be successful as a 
job creating strategy? It appears unlikely. After all, relative to median earnings from 
full time work, earnings at the 10
th percentile have fallen by about 15 per cent. If the 
policy recommended by the five economists is to work it seems that a very large real 
wage fall is needed. A five per cent wage reduction would only put real wages back to 
the level of the 1991 recession when unemployment was 11 per cent.  
There is one further difficulty associated with this policy. The five economists 
advocated that the government offset the real wage reduction with a tax concession to 
preserve the income of the low paid. Of course, the larger the real wage reduction the 
larger the tax concession. A large real wage reduction would most likely translate into 
a real income fall for the low paid as government is unlikely to provide all the subsidy 
needed to replace the wage reduction.  
 
Changes in Labour Supply 
The second set of ideas that may lead to a reduction in the unemployment rate focus 
on the supply side of the labour market.  There are two separate approaches here. 
First, a preliminary glance at the employment history over the last two decades 
indicates that supply side adjustments and supply side policy have been important in 
reducing the level of unemployment, particularly in the full-time labour market.  For 
example, all the reduction in male unemployment since 1975 has been a supply side 
response. The full-time employment-population ratio has fallen by 12 percentage   14 
points and yet the unemployment-population ratio has only increased by 2 percentage 
points.  This supply side adjustment has taken the form of increased school retention, 
increased attendance at institutions of higher learning, increased rates of early 
retirement for the older male age groups, and increased use of invalid pensions. For 
women increased attendance at education institutions and diversion into part-time jobs 
has been important. The full-time employment-population ratio for women today is 
much the same as in 1966. Each of these supply side adjustments has involved 
increased government expenditure and it now appears that they have run their course. 
It is difficult to see government financed supply reductions being an important 
influence in the future except for the encouragement of women to stay at home to look 
after young children.  
Although supply side responses have reduced unemployment, the failure of 
employment to grow quickly, and the increasing fiscal cost associated with supply 
reducing policies, is leading to a change in the supply side emphasis. The new 
emphasis is proceeding in the opposite direction to reducing supply. Over a number of 
years the government has been attempting to build political support for the argument 
that the high level of unemployment is the result of social security recipients not 
accepting jobs and preferring to remain on benefits. The idea is that increased use of 
social security payments for income support is acting to reduce the effective labour 
supply and is weakening labour market pressure for real wage reductions. In this way 
the supply side of the labour market might be thought responsible for the lack of 
employment growth. 
The increased attention directed towards social security recipients leads to a 
number of policy changes. First, policy has begun to make access to social security 
income support more difficult. Many asset and income tests are now more stringent. 
Longer waiting times have been introduced before individuals can gain access to 
particular programs. 
Second, policy is now placing more emphasis on the welfare to work transition.  
One aspect of this policy has been to increase the degree of individual case 
management and to attempt to tailor the social security system more closely to the job 
finding needs of each individual. As part of this policy, job finding agencies have been 
privatised, and, training and job placement activities subject to tender.  
Third, more financial assistance is now being offered to the low paid to accept 
jobs and to remain in employment. As low wages fall, in relative terms, the incentive 
structure is changing to make welfare support more attractive relative to low paid 
employment. To offset this government is increasing the rewards from employment by 
allowing some individuals to keep some welfare income support while in low paying 
jobs. There is considerable interest in extending de facto wage subsidies to the 
working poor. These schemes might be loosely described by the political slogan – 
“making work pay”. 
The logical extension of this policy is to reduce the level of income support for 
those on social security income and to place a cap on the period of time that an 
individual can access benefits. Some hints that the government is considering moving 
in these directions is contained in the recent discussion paper used to launch the 
current review of the welfare system. 
Although a welfare system obviously weakens the incentive to accept just any 
job there is no substantial evidence in Australia that the welfare system has been   15 
responsible for the increase in the underlying unemployment rate. The increase in the 
underlying rate of unemployment is confined to a very short period of time –1975-
1983. The loss of jobs seem quite clearly to be a demand side phenomenon. If the 
welfare system were responsible it might be expected that the underlying rate of 
unemployment would increase smoothly throughout the period.  
 
Section IV 
Cyclical Unemployment and Future Prospects 
The focus to this point has been on real wages and the underlying rate of 
unemployment.  Of course much of the unemployment literature is concerned with 
the relationship between cyclical unemployment and the rate of increase of nominal 
wages. In its simplest terms the analysis usually proceeds as follows; when 
unemployment becomes low, nominal wages begin to increase in response to market 
pressures and then monetary policy is tightened, unemployment increases in response 
to higher interest rates and nominal wage increases are moderated.  The variations of 
cyclical unemployment take place around the underling rate of unemployment.  In 
this literature the underlying unemployment rate is usually called the natural rate of 
unemployment. 
Through most of the last fifty years it has been thought that this model of the 
unemployment cycle has fitted the Australian data well. But there is increasing 
evidence that the relationship between nominal wage increases, interest rate cycles 
and unemployment cycles is not as close as in the past.  
After the 1982 recession it was hoped that the Accord would enable Australia to 
avoid large nominal wage increases, avoid tight monetary policy and in this way 
protect the economy from large increases in cyclical unemployment. Although the 
Accord was fairly successful at moderating wage and price increases it could not 
control the rate of growth of asset prices that accelerated quickly during the 1989-
1991 period.  During this time there was widespread concern that the asset price boom 
would spread to the labour market and lead to increases in nominal wages and 
inflation. Hence monetary policy was tightened and Australia experienced the largest 
recession of the post World War II period. Nominal wage increases did not initiate the 
interest rate increases. 
There is also some evidence that the Australian economy has responded to the 
adverse experiences of the last major recession as wage and price increases have been 
moderate over the last decade.  But now, in early 2000, another cycle of interest rate 
increases has begun with more interest rate increases to come. It is an interesting 
aspect of the present interest rate cycle that to a considerable extent interest rate 
increases have been following the tightening of US monetary policy rather than 
responding directly to Australian nominal wage outcomes.  The mechanism by which 
the US tightening has generated a response here has been via the Australian exchange 
rate which has devalued considerably over the last twelve months and, at the time of 
writing, is falling further. It is being argued that this will eventually increase the 
domestic inflation rate as import price increases, and the export income stimulus feeds 
into the Australian economy. Hence the need for interest rate increases to prevent the 
exchange rate from falling. If cyclical unemployment increases, as is likely, it will not   16 
have been triggered by increases in nominal wages. 
How far might interest rates increase? Could we expect as large an increase in 
unemployment as in the 1982-1983 and the 1991-1993 recessions? It is surprisingly 
difficult to answer these questions. Official forecasts are still predicting a significant 
decrease in unemployment over the year 2000-2001, which seems a little surprising, 
given that interest rates are clearly on the increase. Official forecasts, however, failed 
to predict the seriousness of the downswings in 1982 and 1992.  
Australian recessions have always coincided with world recessions. Australia has 
never been able to escape the domestic consequences of a world downturn5. 
Consequently, the extent to which cyclical unemployment increases depends critically 
on the rate of growth of the world economy over the next year or two.  Although 
forecasts of world economic growth are optimistic it is noticeable that world interest 




Over the last decade, deregulating the labour market, discouraging unionism and 
encouraging enterprise bargaining have been the major policies to reduce 
unemployment. The belief has been that these policies will increase wage flexibility 
and allow wages to fall in particular labour markets of high unemployment. Many 
other policies have been introduced, such as privatising the Commonwealth 
Employment Service, changing the social security system and encouraging education 
but they have clearly been of second order importance. 
Have these policies been successful? They have certainly achieved many of their 
intermediate targets. Unions are weaker, enterprise bargaining is more common and 
centralised wage fixing has been abandoned, except for safety net adjustments. 
However, success at changing the underlying rate of unemployment has been limited.   
On the positive side the rate of labour productivity growth has increased and has 
returned to growth rates typical of the pre 1975 period. Higher labour productivity 
growth rates have allowed a looser monetary policy regime and presumably faster 
economic growth.  Faster economic growth in turn has helped employment growth. 
But it is clear that the rewards of higher productivity growth have been primarily 
directed towards real wage increases rather than employment growth.  
To date, the labour markets new institutional structure has not delivered faster 
employment growth and therefore, from the viewpoint of unemployment, the policy 
has not succeeded. But perhaps it could be argued that it is too early to make this 
judgement?  In the longer term it may be that the success of the new labour market 
will be judged by whether Australia can avoid another major recession in the near 
future.  If Australia can avoid a deep recession the current rate of unemployment of 
around 7 per cent might form a platform from which unemployment can be further 
                                                            
5 In the past, Australian nominal wages increases have always coincided with world boom periods and 
increases in world interest rates. Hence, it has always been difficult to separate out how much of the 
tightening of Australia’s monetary policy is a response to the Australian domestic economy and how 
much is a response to world interest rate changes.   17 
reduced. Already the economy growth rate is showing signs of slowing as Australian 
interest rates move upwards along with those of the US. 
Will avoidance of a major recession be sufficient to achieve a sustained and 
significant reduction in unemployment? It is not clear. There are two clouds on the 
horizon. First, to the extent that reductions in the underlying rate of unemployment  
require real wage moderation, there is not much room for optimism. The increased 
rate of technological change is being primarily directed towards real wage increases 
rather than employment gains. Second, there must be some concern as to future labour 
supply changes. Over the last decade unemployment has fallen because of significant 
reductions in the labour supply. Indeed, the proportion of the population employed 
full-time, is the lowest it has ever been. If a new policy evolves to move people off 
social security income support into the labour market then the need for a faster rate of 
job growth will increase. It is difficult, at the moment, to envisage how the economy 
can deliver these jobs. 
What then will be done about unemployment? My guess is very little. None of 
the political parties have any new policies that are likely to be effective. All seem to 
be hoping that a recession can be avoided and hence economic growth, and continual 
falls in the relative pay of the low paid, will eventually reduce the unemployment rate. 
All this suggests that the reduction in unemployment may well be a slow process, 
especially if the labour supply reductions which have been such a noticeable feature of 
the past are no longer an important source of unemployment reductions.  
Unemployment is a large topic and we have not been able to cover all the issues 
that matter but many of our omissions will be discussed in other chapters6. Perhaps 
the most important omission is a discussion as to how Australian experiences relate to 
those of other countries, in particular the US. There are three points that should be 
made with respect to this comparison. First, the Australian pattern of technological 
changes through time has also occurred in the US. For example, not only did the US 
experience a marked slow down in technological change at the beginning of the 1970s 
but technological change has also accelerated there since the early 1990s. It may be 
quite incorrect, therefore, for us to attribute the recent increase in the rate of 
technological change in Australia to changes in labour market institutions. After all 
the US has shared the same experiences. Second, over the last decade, the US has 
generated a larger increase in employment than during any other decade over the last 
fifty years. It is not as though there is something about all modern economies that 
prevents job growth and that all economies cannot cope with sudden shifts in the rate 
and nature of technological change. In the US, real wage increases responded very 
quickly to the technological slowdown in the early 1970s and the US labour market 
avoided the large real wage increases that occurred in Australia.  Finally, all 
Australian recessions have coincided with US recessions and it is the US environment 
that is generating the current round of interest rate increases. To a significant extent 
                                                            
6 Now that the chapter has been completed I am a little surprised at the emphasis that has been placed 
on the real wage-labour productivity balance especially as I have always been sceptical of real wage 
explanations of unemployment.  My original intention was to be more eclectic in the discussion. So why 
direct so much attention to this issue?  The reason is that among important economic policy institutions 
– such as the Treasury, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the OECD and the IMF – there are only two 
consistently advocated positions to explain the high rate of unemployment. One is that the demand for 
labour is insufficient because real wages are too high.  The other is that the economy is operating near 
full employment because of supply side constraints.  
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our ability to avoid a major recession in the near future may well depend on influences 
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